

FASSKEY

Authentication for Everyone













Our Goals

- Secure & Simple Authentication and Identification for any purpose
- Simple and private Mobile payment and shopping
- Especially for the un-banked and developing countries

Username/Password

- So many breaches
- So many bad servers
- Poor/reused passwords
- Bigger website=bigger target
- Mobile servers: same problems
- Hopeless



















Source: <https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites>

	myspace	359,420,698	MySpace accounts
	in	164,611,595	LinkedIn accounts
		152,445,165	Adobe accounts
tumblr.	tumblr	65,469,298	tumblr accounts
	Fling	40,767,652	Fling accounts 🔥
		30,811,934	Ashley Madison accounts 🔥
mate1	Mate1	27,393,015	Mate1.com accounts 🔥
		13,545,468	000webhost accounts
		13,186,088	R2Games accounts
	gamigo	8,243,604	Gamigo accounts
	Heroes of Newerth	8,089,103	Heroes of Newerth accounts
lifeboat	Lifeboat	7,089,395	Lifeboat accounts
		5,915,013	Nexus Mods accounts
vtech	VTech	4,833,678	VTech accounts 📧
@mail.ru	mail.ru Dump	4,821,262	mail.ru Dump accounts
		4,789,599	Bitcoin Security Forum Gmail Dump accounts

The 50 Most Used Passwords

- | | | | | |
|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1. 123456 | 11. 123123 | 21. mustang | 31. 7777777 | 41. harley |
| 2. password | 12. baseball | 22. 666666 | 32. f*cky*u | 42. zxcvbnm |
| 3. 12345678 | 13. abc123 | 23. qwertyuiop | 33. qazwsx | 43. asdfgh |
| 4. qwerty | 14. football | 24. 123321 | 34. jordan | 44. buster |
| 5. 123456789 | 15. monkey | 25. 1234...890 | 35. jennifer | 45. andrew |
| 6. 12345 | 16. letmein | 26. p*s*y | 36. 123qwe | 46. batman |
| 7. 1234 | 17. shadow | 27. superman | 37. 121212 | 47. soccer |
| 8. 111111 | 18. master | 28. 270 | 38. killer | 48. tigger |
| 9. 1234567 | 19. 696969 | 29. 654321 | 39. trustno1 | 49. charlie |
| 10. dragon | 20. michael | 30. 1qaz2wsx | 40. hunter | 50. robert |

Source: <https://wpengine.com/unmasked/>

 Position: Agent to the stars Password: clydek Entropy: 12.2 Crack Time: 0.2 seconds	 Position: Former Senior Password: s3ash311 (seashell) Entropy: 15.6 Crack Time: 2.5 seconds	 Position: Director Password: indiana Entropy: 9.8 Crack Time: 0.04 seconds	 Position: Senior Director Password: wuxi6969 Entropy: 21.9 Crack Time: 5 minutes	 Position: Software Engineer Password: muffins Entropy: 12.3 Crack Time: 0.2 seconds	 Position: Senior Manager Password: 123456 Entropy: 1.0 Crack Time: 0 seconds
 Position: On-air Correspondent Password: ballet Entropy: 12.2 Crack Time: 0.24 seconds	 Position: Journalist Password: raven639 Entropy: 19.4 Crack Time: 34 seconds	 Position: Senior Engineer Password: ez1422 Entropy: 23.6 Crack Time: 12 minutes	 Position: Digital Reporter Password: blah11 Entropy: 14.7 Crack Time: 1.3 seconds	 Position: Manager Password: b0j1k0 Entropy: 27.8 Crack Time: 5 hours	 Position: Editor Password: kellymisty Entropy: 14.2 Crack Time: 0.9 seconds
 Position: Editor Password: shagwell Entropy: 16.8 Crack Time: 5.8 seconds	 Position: Division Chief Password: linco1n Entropy: 10.9 Crack Time: 0.09 seconds	 Position: Editor Password: dgnco Entropy: 22.0 Crack Time: 5 minutes	 Position: Editor Password: sassy1 Entropy: 12.0 Crack Time: 0.2 seconds	 Position: Global Director Password: [firstname] Entropy: 9.1 Crack Time: 0.02 seconds	 Position: Program Manager Password: 123[yearofbirth] Entropy: 10.4 Crack Time: 0.07 seconds

Hacking real people's passwords

Source: <https://wpengine.com/unmasked/>

FASSKEY Method


- Based on Steve Gibson's public domain SQRL (<https://www.grc.com/sqrl>)
- User generates a single, random 256 bit EC Master Key
- A web site's domain name is used to key a hash which produces a private key. The matching public key is created and registered with the website as the user's identity token for that site.
- To authenticate the user at logon, the website presents a per-logon "nonce" (qlink). The user signs the qlink using the site-specific private key and returns both the site-specific public key and the "nonce" signed by the matching private key.
- All messages are encrypted, authenticated and signed.



qlink

- Domain for key generation
- 32 byte nut includes: timestamp, site & operator IDs, nonce, MAC
- protocol type
- 32 byte server ephemeral public key



qrl://demo.fasskey.com/squal_auth_login.php?
nut=zBPmr7UN1rO-kMCWFAfAqEtS5ibAqOYq59n7Cxtlse0
&protocol=SQT-AUTH
&epk=ka46kc_XlCevG34NAYwizRqq9JRJ58QGphQ-5o24Hds






Creating per-site key pairs

This means:

- Users are per-site pseudonymous.
 - They present a unique but fixed identity to every site.
 - Inter-site tracking is eliminated.
- Since identities are deterministically synthesized from the site's domain name, so no per-site data needs to be stored.
- Users give web servers no secrets to keep. Web servers receive an identity token that is only meaningful for that site.
 - Disclosure of the public key is not damaging
 - No cross site correlation or tracking
- The use of a nonce using a simple challenge/response mechanism prevents reuse / replay attacks.

Authentication Protocol Flow



V (1). Website gets qlink from BB.

S (2). User receives qlink from Website.

T (3). User sends qlink to Provider(MBB) for checking.

T (4). User receives attestation key from Provider(MBB), proving Website.

T (5). User sends signed, TLE response to website.

V (6). Website forwards response to BB.

V (7). BB approves User and gives User ID.

S (8) Logged in, web page updated.

V – VPN connection

T – TLE protocol

S – OptionalSSL / TLS connection


Problems

- User must remember one strong password, which never leaves his device
- Website cannot “recover” or “reset” user’s authentication
- If master key is compromised...


Lock/Unlock/Rekey

- We use a special key pair for these operations
- The user may lock any or all sites from his client
- Unlock or Rekey can be done only with special “unlock key”, which is never stored in the client.
- Unlock key is generated along with master key, then stored offline, via printout and operator backup
- The unlock key is an EC secret key, the matching public key is called the “lock key”.


Performed during identity creation



Performed to lock identity



Performed to unlock identity



We use Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement:

Given public key one (PubKey1) and secret key one (SecKey1)
and public key two (PubKey2) and secret key two (SecKey2), then:

DHKA (PubKey1 , SecKey2) = DHKA (PubKey2 , SecKey1)

Our lock key, IdentityLock, is stored in the client. The unlock key, IdentityUnlock, is offline.

IdentityLock := MakePublic (IdentityUnlock)

Generate a random unlock key for this server.

ServerUnlock := MakePublic (RandomLock)

Use this to also create a VerifyUnlock key.


VerifyUnlock := MakePublic (DHKA (IdentityLock , RandomLock))

The server stores both ServerUnlock and VerifyUnlock. The client discards RandomLock.

To unlock or rekey the account, server sends ServerUnlock to the client. Client uses this, in combination with his IdentityUnlock key to generate the secret key:


DHKA (IdentityLock , RandomLock) = DHKA (ServerUnlock , IdentityUnlock)

This is used to sign the unlock/rekey message to the server. At the server, the signature must match the associated public key, VerifyUnlock.



FASSKey System Architecture

Protocol flow for Shopping



V (1). Seller website gets qlink from BB.

V (2a). BB sends qlink to Seller website.

V (2b). BB registers qlink with MBB.

A (3). User gets qlink from Seller website.

T (4). User sends qlink to Provider(MBB), proving Seller website.

T (5). MBB confirms qlink and sends payment query to User.

T (6). User confirms purchase and payment method.

V (7). MBB sends purchase confirm to BB.

V (8). BB confirms purchase to Seller website.

A (9). Seller website updates to show paid.

V - VPN connection

T - TLE protocol

A - Visual QR Code or NFC

$$\left. \begin{aligned} k1 &= \text{DHKA}(\text{SEPK}, \text{SSSK}) \\ k2 &= \text{DHKA}(\text{SDPK}, \text{CESK}) \\ K &= \text{DHKA}(k1, k2) \end{aligned} \right\} \quad \text{Client Session Key}$$

- Client knows: Site Specific Secret Key (SSSK)
 - From qlink learns: Server Ephemeral Public Key (SEPK)
 - From MBB learns: Server Domain Public Key (SDPK)
 - Creates: Client Ephemeral Secret Key (CESK)
-
- Server knows: Server Domain Secret Key (SDSK) and Server Ephemeral Secret Key (SESK)
 - From Client learns: Client Ephemeral Public Key (CEPK) and user's Site Specific Public Key (SSPK)

$$\left. \begin{aligned} k1 &= \text{DHKA}(\text{SESK}, \text{SSPK}) \\ k2 &= \text{DHKA}(\text{SDSK}, \text{CEPK}) \\ K &= \text{DHKA}(k1, k2) \end{aligned} \right\} \quad \text{Server Session Key}$$

Payment methods

- Integrated eWallet system
- Shopping payment methods
- P2P payments
- Store POS sales
- Casual POS sales
- Banking
- ATM access

All payments methods can use pure eWallet system.
No bank account, no credit card necessary.

Questions?